ity'' of color experience. She then claims that vision scientists ''quite obviously implicitly accept a noneliminativist, realist view about intrinsic phenomenal [qualities] of color experience,'' where a realist view holds that intrinsic phenomenal qualities supervene on internal physiological properties of perceivers.
However, it is not clear how any of this helps to address the dispute between phenomenal internalism and phenomenal externalism. She claims that intrinsic phenomenal qualities are internal properties of perceivers' color experiences. Certainly color experiences have internal properties. But externalism accepts that they do. For externalism accepts that internal properties, such as those described by the opponentprocess theory, are involved in color perception. Rather, what externalism denies is that phenomenal qualities-the qualitative aspects of color experience-are internal properties.
Furthermore, color experience clearly involves phenomenal qualities of some sort. But when raising the question of the nature of phenomenal qualities, it is important to use the term ''phenomenal qualities'' in a way which does not prejudge an answer. Thus we can consider whether, for example, phenomenal qualities are internal properties of perceivers, or physical properties of physical objects perceived, or some other sort of property.
However, Nida-Rümelin uses the term ''intrinsic phenomenal quality'' to assert that phenomenal qualities are internal properties and deny that they are physical properties of physical objects. Since the question of the nature of phenomenal qualities is philosophically controversial, she cannot simply assert an answer without argument. Thus, she cannot simply deny that phenomenal qualities are physical properties of physical objects without argument.
Indeed, she does not motivate internalism independently of vision scientists' descriptions which assume it. But to address my externalist criticism, she needs to provide an argument for internalism. Without one, neither vision scientists nor philosophers are justified in describing pseudonormal vision as a case of spectrum inversion.
